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I. Introduction
Many years ago I was trained as a lawyer, in fact at one stage also here at Southern
Methodist University (SMU). But having now been a business manager for almost thirty
years, and as chairman of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), I hope you will
forgive me when I approach the subject of controlling corruption from a business perspec-
tive rather than in terms of a legal analysis.
Corruption is, after all, an economic crime. It is a rent-seeking activity. When one looks
at estimates of some $1.34 trillion (U.S. dollars) as the sort of annual profits made globally
by organized crime, one starts to comprehend the degree of motivation that fuels corruption
on the demand side. For Russia, it is estimated that forty percent of the country's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is now controlled by organized crime, with about 41,000 eco-
nomic entities beholden to criminal elements. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, federal
officials and bureaucrats are said to have taken some $100 billion (U.S. dollars) in bribes.'
When speaking about corruption, I always joke that any effort by a businessman to sound
knowledgeable about the subject immediately risks the suspicion that one has had some
relevant experience. Also, keep in mind that PBEC is partially a lobby group, and lobbying
is a somewhat gray area when trying to define corruption.
I am reminded of the experience of an expatriate working in a small town in India who
had problems with his kitchen sink. When the plumber asked for an exorbitant sum after
cleaning the drains and refused to leave if not paid, the expatriate decided to phone the
local police. He was assured they would come right by and sort things out provided, of
course, that he was agreeable to pay them the usual "attendance fee."
In my own case, perhaps the main qualification for giving this lecture is the fact that the
current Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong
Kong, where I live, used to be my secretary. Her name is Lily Kwan Yam Pui-ying, and she
is doing an excellent job in a difficult position at a critical time. In truth, she is a senior civil
servant and was secretary to a government committee I chaired in 1994 to review the opera-
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tions and the accountability of the ICAC. Our committee produced some seventy-six rec-
ommendations for change and improvement. However, we left the principal structure, op-
erating style, and the powers of the agency pretty well as they were. By and large, it had
done an excellent job in the twenty years since its establishment, and one does not want to
tinker with obvious success in that field or risk demotivating good people just to score points.
PBEC, as the most prominent independent business associated in the Pacific Rim, has
taken a strong interest in the subject of corruption and, as recently as May 1998, has unan-
imously promulgated a Charter on Standards for Transactions Between Business and Gov-
ernment.2 Given the fact that PBEC counts some 1,200 member companies from twenty
widely different economies employing some eleven million people, and collectively gen-
erating sales of some $4.25 trillion (U.S. dollars), this was no mean achievement.
PBEC is arguing for integrity, transparency, and accountability in dealings between en-
terprises and public bodies, in particular as concerns the awarding of government contracts
and permits, tax matters, environmental, and other regulatory matters, and judicial and
legislative proceedings.
The PBEC Charter also calls for the respect of laws and standards, a prohibition on
improper inducements, the control of agents, and proper financial recordings and auditing
procedures. Management and directors of enterprises are encouraged to establish proper
internal guidelines and controls, and to ensure statutory conformity and proper disclosure
of political contributions. PBEC supports the notion of "zero tolerance" on the basis that
integrity should not be negotiable. The in-house PBEC Committee on Transparency con-
tinues its work, and is prompting our organization to support other efforts being made in
this field at the national and international level.
H. Current Developments
These efforts are many and varied, and have taken on a new momentum in recent years
for reasons described in more detail later.
The United States was first with legislation when it put the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 19771 on the statute books. It prohibits all U.S. corporations and their U.S.
and foreign officers and directors, but not their foreign subsidiaries, from offering money
or anything of value to foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business.
In March 1996, twenty-three countries belonging to the Organization of American States
(OAS) signed the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (ICAC). I understand
that only ten countries have ratified it.
Also in 1996, the United Nations produced a Declaration Against Corruption and Brib-
ery in International Commercial Transactions, while the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris issued a Revision to its Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in
International Business Transactions. A year later, the VIII International Conference Against
Corruption promulgated the Lima Declaration of 1997.
The most important international effort to date, however, is the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, signed on December 17,
2. Pacific Basin Economic Council, Charter on Standards for Transactions Between Business and Government
(visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.pbec.org/policy/1998/igmstandards.htm>.
3. U.S. Foreign Corruption Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
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1997, by twenty-nine OECD member nations and five non-member nations.4 It should
have become effective on February 15, 1999, after the requisite ratifications.
The OECD Convention provides a base for creating effective anti-bribery systems in
countries with different legal systems. Its principal provision, article 1, makes it a crime for
"any person" to "offer, promise, or give any undue pecuniary advantage, whether directly
or through intermediaries, to any foreign public official."' This convention goes further
than the U.S. legislation,6 but still does not address the issue of payments to foreign political
parties, party officials, or candidates. It also does not provide comprehensive coverage of
foreign subsidiaries. It left open the question of tax deductibility for bribes, although there
is general agreement that they should be eliminated. The issue of the collective monitoring
of undesirable or illegal practices was deferred to subsequent agreements. PBEC has also
publicly supported the advent of the OECD Convention and is encouraging nations that
have not yet signed it to do so.
Together with national governments, a number of other supranational institutions have
taken a much more intense interest in the subject of corruption.
The Asian Development Bank has announced a set of guidelines to combat corruption,
particularly in the field of procurement, and is tightening up its lending policies and prac-
tices to prevent the availability of credit to projects where bribery is suspected or proven.
The Inter-American Development Bank has also started to increase its support for private
sector reform efforts, and is keen to ensure proper procurement practices.
In a similar vein, the World Bank has stepped up its audit procedures to strengthen
borrower accountability, and has published procurement guidelines that its clients should
observe, barring firms that offer bribes from further bank finance, and even threatening to
cancel loans to governments whose officials are found to have solicited bribes.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is also working on an Agreement on Transpar-
ency in Procurement. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced that it will
restrict its involvement in countries where the level of corruption is deemed to negatively
affect domestic economic performance. APEC's Government Procurement Experts Group7
continues to deliberate on how to increase transparency and how to enlarge the support
for regional activity meant to prevent corruptive practices.
Transparency International, a Berlin, Germany-based non-profit, non-governmental
global alliance of national groups endeavoring to pursue greater accountability in govern-
ment and an honest business environment, has also become more active in recent times. It
attempts to promote public awareness through lectures and conferences, by packaging Spe-
cial Integrity Programs, and by focusing on the underlying causes of corruption. The latter
in particular is important.
More conferences are being organized to highlight corruptive practices and their possible
prevention or eradication. Eighty-nine nations participated in the "Global Forum in Fight-
ing Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity among Justice and Security Officials," chaired
by U.S. Vice President Al Gore, which focused on corruption in police forces and in the
4. Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic.
5. "Any person" includes legal persons. This provides some problems in jurisdictions that do not recognize
the criminal liability of legal entities, such as Germany, Sweden, or Switzerland.
6. The U.S. legislation does not include bribery in government procurement, tax payments, or judicial
proceedings in its ambit.
7. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process now embraces 21 member economies in the Pacific.
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military. Hong Kong held a multinational conference named "Fighting Corruption into
the 21st Century" as part of the ICAC's twenty-fifth anniversary celebration. A large num-
ber of corruption experts came to the Special Administrative Region (SAR) to discuss the
Hong Kong experience, and to examine practical approaches in corruption fighting, pre-
ventive education, and likely trends in the next century with their local counterparts.
M. Changing Attitudes
Why this renewed and extensive interest in corruption? After all, incidents of corruption
are as old as mankind and seem to be an intrinsic by-product of human nature that carries
with it strong instincts of self-preservation, competitive behavior, as well as a large dose of
greed. Corruption is never quite black and white but comes in many forms and shades.
There is simple gift-giving with ulterior commercial motives (evening entertainment, fancy
restaurants, or golf outingsS), and then there are elaborate schemes designed to provide
preferential access to market positions, to financial assets or to other public goods, with a
big register of other inducement methods in between.
Corrupt behavior can be caused by a simple wish to avoid frustration by getting around
bureaucratic hurdles, but it can also be the starting point for elaborate and more sinister
attempts at influencing legislative programs or judicial decisions.
Many habits formed by the need to rely on strong private relationships for business
dealings are today described as corrupt. Social traditions that developed over centuries-
not least from the feudal structure and the mind-set that characterized long periods in the
development of the world's civilizations-did not see much that was objectionable in of-
fering and accepting bribes. The "looking after friends" and the "purchase" of favors was
a matter of courtesy and necessity and part of normal dealing, not something unusual,
dishonest, or illicit.9 Often the community values actually required regular outward signs
of recognition of persons of higher authority, of greater rank, or of more influence from
those in subordinate positions. In other words, bribing your way through life was not
reprehensible at all, it was smart. It would assure success in business and in the professions,
and more often than not, the very survival of those offering bribes, not just their personal
well-being.
Such practices in personal and commercial intercourse, whenever readily understood and
accepted as a norm, become part of the culture and, as a result, much more difficult to
change or abandon. The ways of producing goods and providing services can be influenced
and adjusted over a relatively short period of time because of technical progress and indi-
vidual technological advances, but we need to remain aware that the human character fol-
lows a biological clock and is much slower in adapting.
It is probably the open recognition of this weakness that has prompted some economists
to seriously suggest that corruption should not be seen as entirely negative. Indeed, some
have argued that bribery might still be required or could be very useful in underdeveloped
economies as a necessary lubricant to permit faster economic growth. "Oiling the wheels"
is an old engineering solution to generate higher speed and to ensure less frequent break-
downs in machinery. It is perhaps not suprising that the concept imposed itself in the context
8. These are examples of traditional practices that in the last two years have brought down a number of
politicians and civil servants in Japan-no doubt to the latter's considerable surprise.
9. See What's Wrong With Nepotism, Anyway?, THE EcoNoMIST, Mar. 20, 1999, at 58.
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of social interaction when discussing social and economic progress, quite apart from being
a ready excuse for behavior that was starting to become the subject of criticism.
In the old days, the lines of distinction between "allowed" and "disallowed" behavior
among men of honor used to be fuzzier, especially since political authority was often vested
in individuals with a high degree of unquestioned discretion (especially when derived
through dynastic succession), and not in the sort of impersonal institutions that we have in
most places today. These institutions have clearly defined organization charts, internal re-
sponsibility, and reporting rules and are run by elected public officials, are subject to wide
scrutiny, and have to prove objectivity, impartiality, or neutrality.
What, then, has changed the global attitudes toward corruptive behavior, and what has
turned it from a widely tolerated practice to one that is seen as negative or outright de-
structive? A number of factors are responsible.
A. GLOBAIZATION
At the top of the list I would put the relentless process of economic and political glob-
alization, itself essentially caused by the rapid advance in computing power, cheap com-
munications, and cheap transportation. Today, information has become the latest and most
powerful factor of production, having the benefit of being both repeatedly usable and almost
ubiquitous.
Globalization is producing a number of changes to the existing scene that will assist in
the effort to reduce or eradicate corruption:
" Globalization means the gradual removal of market niches and oligopolies.0
" It leads to a blending of cultures.
" Globalization also tends to blur the differences between political systems and the vari-
ous forms of government administration.
" It puts pressure on governments to work towards economic liberalization, in particular
by removing more of the existing administrative barriers.
" Globalization increases social mobility based on merit, rather than origin, caste, or
family connections.
" Globalization also forces the pace in competition among locations, and creates truly
global benchmarks. Tolerance levels for inefficiencies tend to become much lower.
Mobile international capital has quickly discovered the global advantages of choice and
speed, and is more than willing to exploit system weaknesses anywhere to maximize the
opportunities for arbitrage and profit. As a result, because they are (and probably have to
be) fairly unscrupulous, the managers of short-term international capital flows have become
the scapegoats for many of the economic ills today.
However, the current Asian economic crisis was precipitated not so much by the hedge
funds, as we are led to believe by our politicians, but by governments' unwillingness or
10. A new concern is raised by the recent merger mania, resulting in significantly higher concentrations of
economic power in the hands of fewer players. However, monopolistic entities might not, in fact, be as much
"in need" of corruptive practices as oligopolistic cartels, since the former can feel more confident to get their
way through sheer size and market muscle, while the latter must still compete within the cartel. Cf E K. Y.
Chen, Megatrends in the 21 st Century: Market-Oriented Anti-Corruption Policies, Address at the Independent
Commission Against Corruption Conference (Mar. 22, 1999).
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inability to recognize and remedy their inherent institutional problems, or by not facing
the consequences of a pursuit of outdated economic policies and political practices. Some
countries, especially in the developing world, still seem convinced that the old ways are
better. They and their peoples risk losing out in the intensifying global competitive race.
Easy information flows and improvement in education have given the world an unprec-
edented ability to make comparisons on a global scale on almost anything. Few communities
are cut off from the rest of the world. Computers and the Internet allow individuals access
to data and to opinions and ideas, irrespective of location. National boundaries are becom-
ing irrelevant for many economic activities. In fact, national boundaries today sometimes
inhibit, rather than promote, economic advancement. The world should start to think more
seriously about the justification for maintaining the nation-state, not just glibly talk about
the "borderless world" on the one hand, and the need for regional missile defense systems
on the other.
Adherence to "best practice," as well as superior performance and innovative capability,
now play a major part in determining the success or failure of enterprises, more than per-
sonal relationships and the resultant need to keep them alive with courtesies of a material
kind. It is slowly dawning on everyone that corruption does not need to be a natural by-
product of doing business, as is the realization (and widening acceptance) that corruption
is not necessary for doing good business.
The process of globalization, of course, also has negative effects in that the ease of modern
communications assists criminals, particularly in allowing more extensive and more complex
cross-border crime to take place. Easy money flows, "helpful" jurisdictions, financial insti-
tutions under the control of criminal syndicates, and new computer technology make it that
much more difficult to prevent money-laundering and credit fraud, for example. Cyberspace
crime is undoubtedly on the increase. International mobility also makes it correspondingly
much more problematic to trace and eradicate corruption.
B. DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS
Next to the globalizing economy, it is the modern democratic systems that provide bil-
lions of people today with an environment in which equality and human dignity are pro-
tected by the rule of law and no longer by the rule of men.
Functioning democracies are, by definition, prone to regular changes among those in
power, to a certain extent reducing the attraction of investing in personal relationships since
they may turn out not only to be temporary, but occasionally counter-productive. Demo-
cratic governments also mean open and accountable power structures and decision-making
processes that can be, and are, readily and publicly scrutinized. With guaranteed freedom
of speech and freedom of the press in democratic systems, the risks of public embarrassment
and other community sanctions are thus correspondingly higher, and will have a serious
dampening effect on the temptation to abuse public office for personal gain, the classic
short definition of corruption."
Changes in political regimes, and the transformation from one political philosophy to
another, however, do raise new problems. As we have seen again in recent times, the nec-
11. There is, in fact, no clear and universally accepted definition of corruption-further evidence of its
complexity.
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essary adjustment processes can affect the livelihood of large populations and create breaks
with traditions, leading at least temporarily to instability and uncertainty. It is not surprising
that countries like China and Russia are struggling today in the way European nations
struggled in past centuries when faced with similar, albeit mostly more gradual, social and
political change.
C. POLITICAL REASSESSMENT
The world today is also more advanced in recognizing the essential factors that drive
economic progress, create wealth, and enhance material well-being.
While there may have been doubt during most of the twentieth century about the relative
merits of competing political philosophies and their economic manifestations, the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1991 and current efforts in China, the world's most populous country,
to engage in reforms leading towards the creation of a market economy 2 should be con-
vincing evidence of the superior benefits of open capitalist systems and competitive mar-
ketplaces.
Where there is still no trade liberalization, where there continues to be excessive gov-
ernment involvement in the economic processes through state ownership of enterprises and
politicized managerial decision-making, or where there still exist price controls, subsidies,
directed credit, or excessive regulation, cronyism, nepotism, and corruption will remain a
serious threat.'
Put simply, while an absence of institutional rules and regulations to govern personal
behavior can facilitate arbitrary, discretionary power, an excess of government rules and
regulations will equally feed the supply side of corruption. In the current world, deregu-
lation seems to be by far the wiser choice.
D. EcoNoMic CONSIDERATIONS
Probably the most fundamental change in attitudes, however, has come with the reali-
zation that corrupt practices extract significant costs in each society in which they prevail,
and exert a blocking rather than a facilitating influence on economic activity. I have men-
tioned at the beginning what kind of profits can apparently be made from organized crim-
inal activity.
As Transparency International executives like to mention, 4 corruption may be a moral
issue, but it has now also become a developmental issue. Corruption unquestionably distorts
rational decision-making and increases transaction costs. A World Bank study in 1997 found
from a survey of business executives that corruption was perceived to be among the three
most important obstacles to conducting business in developing countries.
According to other estimates, corruption acts as a "tax" on public projects, with some
observers suggesting that as much as thirty percent can be added to project costs on oc-
12. Officially and euphemistically called a "socialist market system with Chinese characteristics." In a 1999
session of the National People's Congress in Beijing, provisions in the Chinese Constitution were amended
and now refer to private enterprise as an "important" (and not just a "complementary") sector of the national
economy.
13. Recent events in the International Olympic Committee, and in the European Commission in Brussels,
ending with the en masse resignation of all EU Commissioners, has again highlighted the potential for abuse
when discretionary authority is relatively wide, but the operating style is rather secretive and control mecha-
nisms comparatively insufficient.
14. See M. Schloss, Address at the PBEC Conference (May 26, 1998).
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casion. Governments can lose substantial revenue through the corrupt behavior of its of-
ficials. In some countries, billions of dollars in foreign exchange earnings seem to go missing
every year-in those instances smuggling is likely so widespread becuase of corrupt customs
officers. 5
Through insider dealings and market-restraining practices, corruption can distort market
forces and thereby the efficient allocation of resources. Lower government revenues will
naturally result in fewer physical infrastructure investments or in their proper maintenance,
as well as force a reduction in spending in areas such as education, health, and welfare, or
consumer and environmental protection. Very often not only the quantity, but the quality
of new investment suffers, as well as productivity. The impact on the economic growth
potential of economies afflicted by a high level of corruption can no doubt be substantial.
What we probably need are many more in-depth analyses of the consequences in an effort
to convince and better educate.
Corruption undermines investor confidence, dissuades foreign investment, prompts cap-
ital outflows, and slows economic development because private capital-as I mentioned
earlier-prefers transparent and accountable markets, predictable scenarios, and macroec-
onomic stability. Very simply stated, corruption makes an economy less competitive. In
Hong Kong we have seen over the years that a successful anti-corruption campaign can
make the economy stronger vis-a-vis its neighbors and its regional and international com-
petitors, in both relative and absolute terms.
At the same time, corruption provides the basis for the expansion of other criminal ac-
tivity, from drug dealing to syndicated fraud, from money-laundering and false subsidy
claims to the circumvention of national security rules and weapons embargoes. Public trust
in the rule of law and in public administration suffers. Democratic institutions can become
destabilized. The chance of human rights abuse increases. These are regressive develop-
ments in an age when economic performance is closely related to the free dissemination of
ideas that in turn promote greater personal flexibility and mobility, and more knowledge,
imagination, and innovation.
As I said, it will become increasingly important for all governments that wish to combat
corruption to have the political will to be persistent. Governments must make stronger
attempts to produce public information as to the cost of corruption and the savings that
are achievable by eliminating it. Fighting corruption, of course, also costs money, very often
in substantial amounts, and the taxpaying public must be fully convinced that these are
funds well spent. 6
IV. Enforcement and Prevention
Fighting corruption is not easy. Corruption is a secretive and conspiratorial offense with
no readily identifiable victims other than society at large. As ICAC officials in Hong Kong
put it to my Review Committee in 1994, "there is no scene of crime susceptible to forensic
examination, no corpses to be identified and examined for clues, nor victim witness, and
rarely any untainted witnesses." 7 Indeed, acting against corruption requires special in-
15. Such unexplainable figures, for instance in China, then have to be carried in the national statistics as
due to "errors and omissions."
16. The Hong Kong ICAC, for example, operates on an annual budget in excess of HK$700 million ($90.5
million U.S. dollars).
17. Report of the ICAC Review Comm. to the PBEC (1994), at 27.
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stincts, special powers, and imaginative methods"8 to make up for the difference in the
nature of bribery as against other crimes on the statute books. Often, corruption can only
be fought efficiently by reversing the burden of proof.
A comparatively small number of jurisdictions worldwide have set up dedicated agencies
similar to the ICAC in Hong Kong, 9 while the majority prefer to deal with the problem
through dedicated branches of the regular police forces, or via investigatory units in other
executive arms of government.2 0 The creation of special institutions with a higher degree
of autonomy and/or extended police powers raises some difficult questions, since in order
to protect the rights of individuals these powers must in turn be circumscribed sufficiently,
with institutional safeguards put in place to prevent potential abuse.
Wherever the anti-corruption efforts may be concentrated, often there will also be a
conflict between the duty to hunt down offenders and bring them to justice, and strong
political sensitivities, bearing in mind that in most investigations "public officials" are in-
volved.2'
High-profile investigations of allegedly corrupt public officials could work to undermine
public trust in the political authority generally or confidence in particular branches of gov-
ernment.22 But on the other hand, failure to pursue offenders except where the evidence is
incontrovertible not only carries the same risk, but will additionally create doubts about
the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agency's work and about a government's commit-
ment that adherence to the rule of law is uppermost on its national agenda.
Therefore, the choice should be quite obvious, but will very much depend on the cir-
cumstances prevailing in each jurisdiction. A reality check is always beneficial. Hence, there
are calls from those professionally involved in the fight against corruption that all solutions
should be home grown and tailor-made and, equally importantly, should depend on the
cooperation of all in the society under the slogan "corruption is everybody's business."
In particular, commercial interest groups, professional associations, labor unions, and
concerned civic groups and other non-governmental organizations have a responsibility in
their respective communities to try and help change existing mindsets, and to participate
in eradicating the underlying causes of corruption.
The Hong Kong experience may again be illustrative. When the ICAC was set up, cor-
ruption prevention through education and strong community relations work were seen as
two important adjuncts to the investigatory work of the agency. Over the years of the ICAC's
existence, it has been very successful in its efforts-corruption is regarded by Hong Kong
18. Such methods include having to be equally secretive and relying on undercover work, information
gathering, and insiders as willing wimesses. As the forms of corruption evolve, so obviously must the methods
to combat them.
19. The agencies include Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, Independent Commission
Against Corruption, New South Wales (Australia), and the Anti-Corruption Agency in Malaysia. There are
different degrees of political influence acting on such agencies in different countries. The Hong Kong action
in setting up the ICAC followed widespread corruption in the police force that therefore ruled itself out of
consideration for being the instrument to tackle the problem.
20. In the United States, the Department of Justice oversees enforcement under the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, along with, to some extent, also the Securities Exchange Commission.
21. The judiciary in many jurisdictions seems to take a more lenient view of economic crime than of other
criminal offenses: penalties meted out often appear comparatively mild.
22. For many years, Interpol, the agency that coordinates the liaison between national police forces linked
together in an international network to investigate cross-border crime, was hesitant to take on corruption cases
for that reason. There has also been an attitude change in that body in recent times.
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people not only as a social evil but as quite unnecessary for commercial results. The support
of the community and its trust in the work of the ICAC is also evident in the high degree
of public willingness to report actual or suspected incidents of bribery.
Governments must remain conscious of the need to deal with the problem of corruption
from both the demand and the supply side. Underpaid public officials, excessive regulatory
and bureaucratic systems, wide personal discretion, lax discipline in the uniformed services,
and/or weak oversight bodies-even where these do exist-will tend to create a fertile
ground for corruptive practices every time.
Those charged with the enforcement of anti-corruption laws should also take into ac-
count the ongoing need for generating a perception of effectiveness while maintaining an
image of fairness. Not suprisingly, sometimes corruption investigators are too keen to prove
themselves. Exceeding the limits of their authority can have very negative public relations
consequences. Outside and broadly based control is therefore a crucial element in the make-
up of an effective and respected anti-corruption body. Admittedly, to find the right balance
every time is not easy.
One worrisome development appears to be the expectation by many legislators, embodied
in a number of statutes and conventions, that anti-corruption agencies are capable of in-
vestigating offenses or pursuing offenders beyond the confines of their national jurisdic-
tions. When one of the main objectives has to be to give anti-corruption efforts and agencies
an aura of efficiency and success in order to stimulate wide public support, any statutory
ambitions that cannot be easily implemented are apt to put this effectiveness in doubt and
should be carefully considered.
Difficult as it is to chase criminals in a home jurisdiction, it is even more difficult to do
so overseas, particularly within the complex set of circumstances usually involved in cases
of corruption. The best results are achieved when support for crime fighters comes from
within the community, and it stands to reason that the local team will always receive stronger
support. The solution can only lie in closer liaison and cooperation by the various involved
agencies across national boundaries and improved extradition procedures, rather than in
the attempt to be all things to all people in all places, which quickly increases23 the chance
of facing embarrassing failures. The motto should at all times be: "Take what you can, not
what you can't."
Corruption prevention, as part of the much larger question of ethical behavior, has also
appeared on the agenda of corporate governance study groups, on the listing rules of stock
exchanges, on the curricula of business schools, and on the brief of human resource de-
partments in large companies and industry associations.
Larger corporations find it relatively easy to establish compliance functions, employ in-
house legal advisors, produce elaborate staff manuals, and publish codes of conduct. These
are positive developments in the right direction and thus are welcomed and sponsored by
the PBEC. Codes of conduct can heighten awareness among a wider audience although
they are sometimes criticized as rather inadequate and ineffective attempts at self-regula-
tion. In all cases corporate efforts will, of course, still need to be backed by government
action and by the threat of serious criminal sanctions. Both can and should go together.
These attempts, however, hide a serious practical problem. In many countries with a high
incidence of corruption, not only in the developing world, the domestic economy is not
23. Mutual legal assistance and making bribery of a foreign official an extraditable offense under national
laws and in extradition treaties are specifically provided in the OECD Convention, arts. 9 and 10.
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carried by big local or multinational corporations that can make their own corporate rules
about employee behavior. In many of these places, the national economy is based on a
multitude of small- and medium-sized enterprises. These entities, by definition, do not
have the organizational capabilities, or the money, to engage in elaborate compliance actions
and in extensive advisory and monitoring schemes. We should, therefore, not be misled
into believing that anti-corruption problems will be solved because a number of "big boys"
have signed up for the campaign. A lot of hard work will still need to be done at ground
level, since the temptation to offer bribes is probably inversely proportional to the size and
economic importance of the enterprise. By the way, the same rule can no doubt be applied
to entire countries-the smaller the jurisdiction, the bigger the threat of corruption.2 4
V. Conclusions
It is often said that corruption is the product of bad men and bad laws. So the solution
should be simple: improve the laws and get good men to administer them. We should wish
it was that simple. Even very draconian laws are usually not sufficient. A composite approach
is certainly needed.
Corruption is the result of an interplay of many factors. It is a phenomenon as old as
mankind, if not actually part of human nature. Corruption pervades all civilized society,
and cultural advancement or greater sophistication does not make its occurrence less likely.
It affects all manner of institutions: governments, police forces, armies, banks, charitable
organizations, and social clubs. Corruption is pernicious even when it is accepted as part
of the pattern of everyday life-it produces inequality and unfairness and high social costs.
It can be proven that corruption limits economic growth and keeps millions of people
poorer than they should be.
Corruption is the easy way out, and it takes great strength and will power, both on the
individual and the communal level, to mount effective counter-attacks. Sizeable financial
resources are required and the battle can never be declared won. It needs everlasting vigi-
lance and continued commitment. Civic and social consciousness, reinforced through edu-
cation, must remain an essential part of the armory.
Fighting corruption means fighting for a just society, not necessarily for an easier exis-
tence, because it means putting the common welfare before the aspirations and desires of
individuals. Success in this battle w6uld mean that, as human beings, we have managed to
reach a higher level of rationality, which seems to me to be a goal worth pursuing. Failure,
on the other hand, will mean a continued threat to civil society, to the well-being of nations,
and ultimately to the safe progress of mankind.
24. Of some countries it is jokingly said that "they have the best governments that money can buy." See
Froomkin, supra note 1.
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